6 Critical Developments In The Algerian Intelligence And Judicial Apparatus
Sources have indicated developments and intensification of internal purges, strategic repositioning, and realignment among key branches of Algeria’s judicial and security apparatus. We list the most recent and critical ones:
1. Pending Dismissal of the Justice Minister Abderrachid Tabbi: a decision has been taken to dismiss the current Minister of Justice. This follows the online release by Amir Boukhors of a surveillance video excerpt showing Kamel Chikhi (“El Bouchi”) in the company of Khaled Tebboune, son of Abdelmadjid Tebboune, despite the Abdelmadjid’s prior public statements asserting his son’s non-involvement and release from any legal proceedings. To avoid public interpretation that the dismissal is a direct consequence of the video leak or media pressure, the execution of the decision is being intentionally postponed for several days.
2. Succession Battle for the Justice Ministry Abderrachid Tabbi : Internal discussions are ongoing regarding a replacement. Boualem Boualem, Tebboune’s advisor, has proposed appointing Abderrezak Ben Salem, currently Director of Legal and Judicial Affairs.However, Ben Salem reportedly has a serious moral/ethical file on record which has concerned the entourage. The rival faction within the regime favors the appointment of Boukhari. The clashing nominations mean there are high stakes and internal competition over this strategic position.
3. Minister’s Dependency on Military Intelligence (DCSA): sources indicate that Minister of Justice Abderrachid Tabbi routinely transmits all directives and instructions he receives from the civilian hierarchy to General Mahrez Djeribi, head of the Central Directorate for Army Security (DCSA), for prior validation before implementation. This pattern of behavior is reportedly rooted in a past unresolved incident being used as leverage by the DCSA: during a private stay in Béjaïa, Tabbi allegedly spent the night with a Tunisian woman. Upon waking, he reportedly found her deceased. He then contacted operatives from the DCSA in Constantine, with whom he maintained longstanding relations. They managed the disposal of the body and suppressed the incident. As a result, the DCSA now possesses compromising material on the minister, placing him in a position of enduring dependency and subordination to military intelligence influence over judicial affairs.
4. Military Investigation of Top Security Chiefs: after the dismissal of General Abdelkader Haddad this week, senior officials have been summoned for questioning, among them is General Abdelkader Haddad, now former Director General of Internal Security (DGSI), Ali Badaoui, Director General of National Security (DGSN), Colonel Touazi Amine, alias “Tarek”, Commander of Centre Antar, the regime’s main interrogation and detention facility. The summons were issued by the Centre Principal Militaire d’Investigations (CPMI), the Main Military Investigations Center, under the direct supervision of Chief of Staff Saïd Chengriha.
5. Dismissal and Probe of Lieutenant Colonel Amara Yacine (“Osama”): Lieutenant Colonel Amara Yacine, alias “Osama”, head of the Special Files Unit reporting directly to the Director General of Internal Security, has been dismissed from his post and placed under investigation. The reason: his involvement in establishing an unauthorized hacking and cyber-operations cell “outside legal frameworks”. The cell operated out of Villa 18 in El Biar (Algiers). It was led by Lieutenant Colonel Djamel Baghdadi, alias “Baghdadi”, with participation from: Captain Sofiane Bouchlaghem, alias “Reda”, Captain Anouar Hassani, alias “Anouar”.
6. Upcoming Change in Command at Centre Antar: Colonel Slim Belaazoug is slated for appointment as interim commander of Centre Antar, replacing Colonel Touazi Amine (“Tarek”), who is under investigation.
Currently, the most powerful institutional instruments within the Algerian regime are the DCSA, led by General Mahrez Djeribi and operating under the authority of Army Chief Saïd Chengriha, and the CPMI, which functions under Chengriha’s direct and personal supervision. These two structures are central to the regime’s consolidation of power and enforcement of internal discipline.
The Ministry of Justice is caught in an unresolved succession conflict, deeply entangled in factional competition and public scrutiny, with its future direction closely watched by both regime insiders and the broader population. In reality, it is entirely compromised, operating under continuous surveillance, pressure, and control by the DCSA, rendering it institutionally subordinate.
The DGSI is under increasing scrutiny amid suspicions of disloyalty, including the collection of compromising material and possibly the formation of a faction plotting a power grab or internal overthrow. Meanwhile, the DGSN (National Police) is viewed as either complicit, passive, or institutionally incompetent in detecting or countering this drift.
The Centre Antar, the regime’s key detention and interrogation site, is undergoing a transition in command, signaling a sensitive moment of recalibration in one of the state’s most feared units.
By contrast, the Presidency emerges as the weakest node in the current structure, reactive, fragmented, and increasingly sidelined. It functions mainly through delayed crisis response and damage-control tactics, with decisions driven more by concern over public perception and legitimacy than by coherent command. Its posture reflects an attempt to project strength through media management, rather than through real institutional authority.
Abderrahmane Fares ✍️
