Egypt and Mauritania Withdraw from Military Exercise in Algeria
Egypt and Mauritania have formally withdrawn from the African Union (AU)–backed “North Africa Peace 3” military exercises, set to take place in Algeria from May 21 to 27, 2025 in Algeria. The decision, triggered by the inclusion of the Polisario Front, has resurfaced long-standing institutional ambiguities surrounding the North African Regional Capability (NARC), one of five regional components of the African Standby Force (ASF), a security mechanism for rapid deployment in Africa, led by the African Union (AU).
While Egypt officially informed Algerian authorities of its decision, it has yet to make a public statement. The news was primarily circulated through Moroccan media outlets, which framed Cairo’s withdrawal as a diplomatic victory.
According to Egyptian officials, the final participant list-including Polisario, the military wing of the AU-recognized Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)-represented an “unnotified change” from the original agreement accepted by Cairo. Egypt maintains that the inclusion of Polisario in any AU security activity constitutes a breach of its commitment to the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Morocco, as Egypt does NOT recognize SADR.
Mauritania, which had not formally objected to the Polisario’s presence in previous NARC arrangements, has now quietly followed Egypt’s lead. While Nouakchott has remained publicly silent, the move is widely interpreted as a diplomatic alignment with Cairo and a gesture of support for Morocco’s territorial claims. Although Mauritania still officially recognizes the SADR, this decision marks a significant shift, signaling the first step toward a formal recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara.
This coordinated withdrawal highlights also the institutional paradox at the heart of AU security mechanisms-how to reconcile AU-wide inclusion with unresolved political tensions between member states. It also signals a possible diplomatic reshuffling in North Africa, with Egypt and Mauritania asserting firmer red lines on the territorial integrity of Morocco and around participation in activities involving the Polisario.
What is the North Africa Peace 3 ?
North Africa Peace 3 is a military exercise organized under the AU framework to operationalize the ASF, scheduled to take place in Algeria from May 21 to 27, 2025. The ASF, established in 2003 under the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), is a continental security mechanism designed to enable rapid deployment in response to crises across Africa. It consists of five regional standby forces coordinated by the AU Peace and Security Council: the NARC, the East African Standby Force (EASF), the Southern African Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG), the ECOWAS Standby Force for West Africa, and the ECCAS Standby Force for Central Africa.
The North African component, NARC, was established in 2005 through a regional agreement signed in Tripoli between Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and the SADR. Although Mauritania falls within the geographical scope of the region, it chose not to participate in the agreement at the time.
In a classified diplomatic cable dated December 1, 2005 (which you can read in full here), sent under immediate priority from the U.S. Liaison Office in Tripoli to then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and key U.S. posts in Algiers, Cairo, Tunis, Rabat, Ottawa, and Western Sahara, as well as to the Commander of U.S. European Command Intelligence (USEUCOM), Vaihingen, Germany, U.S. officials Gregory L. Berry (Principal Liaison Officer) and Ethan A. Goldrich (Deputy Chief of Mission) reported on the establishment of a proposed North African Brigade under the AU’s NARC. The cable was classified “SECRET”, citing foreign government information and foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States as reasons for classification.
The cable referenced press reports from November 17, 2005, which announced that the chiefs of staff from Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and the so-called “Western Sahara Republic” had agreed to form a joint military force. However, more detailed and reliable information was later obtained during meetings on November 29, 2005 with both the Egyptian Embassy in Tripoli and a visiting Canadian regional defense attaché. The Canadian officer, described in the cable as “well informed,” confirmed that a formal agreement had indeed been signed in Tripoli to create the NARC force. The planned structure included: two Algerian battalions, one Egyptian battalion, one Libyan battalion, an Egyptian headquarters element, and a Western Sahara reconnaissance unit, which, according to the Canadian defense attaché, was run by Algerian military forces and lacked independent operational capacity. The cable also conveyed skepticism from both Canadian and Egyptian officials regarding the viability of the initiative, and this was in 2005.
The Issue: AU Membership of SADR Clashes with Bilateral Non-Recognition by AU member States such as Egypt, and Tunisia
The Polisario Front is not a recognized state actor and holds no membership in any international organization-except the AU, where its associated entity, the SADR, has held a seat since 1984. Its admission into the AU (then the OAU) was driven more by political maneuvering than legal consensus. Today, several AU member states-including Egypt, Tunisia, and most notably Morocco-do not recognize the SADR as a sovereign state. This structural contradiction lies at the core of the current diplomatic rift.
Under AU/ASF protocols, ASF activities are open to all member states. Consequently, Algeria has hosted SADR representatives within the NARC structure since its founding in 2005. SADR was a signatory to the original NARC agreement and formally pledged to contribute military observers-though, in practice, these roles were coordinated by Algeria, with actual operational control retained by Algerian forces. Despite its formal inclusion, cooperation remained limited. For example, Egypt repeatedly denied entry visas to SADR officials, forcing RASD-related training to be relocated to Algeria or Libya. Civilian training activities proposed by SADR were also systematically rejected.
While prior NARC activities often took place discreetly, the upcoming “North Africa Peace 3” drills in Algeria, scheduled for May 21–27 2025, mark a significant departure in tone. Algerian state media were preparing an intensive propaganda campaign, portraying the exercise as a major military and diplomatic success. The operation was framed as a high-level AU-backed drill, positioned by Algeria as its own alternative to the U.S.-led African Lion exercises, from which it conspicuously withdrew at the last minute earlier this year.
Exclusive accounts from military sources with direct knowledge of NARC’s structure suggest that its original vision-a North African brigade capable of rapid, AU-coordinated peacekeeping deployment-has long since devolved into a shell mechanism serving narrow national interests. Libya once spearheaded the initiative under Gaddafi, but since his fall in 2011, the NARC has lacked both political will and operational capacity. Algerian military leadership has consistently sought to repurpose the structure as a vehicle for pro-SADR legitimacy, exploiting the ASF’s inclusion criteria while denying real integration or funding commitments.
For instance, although Algeria pledged infrastructure such as a training base at Roui’ba, sources report it has remained non-operational. Civilian component training never took place in Egypt, due to Cairo’s refusal to issue visas to SADR officials-another quiet but telling signal of non-recognition. An Egyptian diplomat noted bluntly that Algeria “used the SADR’s observer status as a loophole to build an illusion of legitimacy.” Attempts to whitewash SADR’s military presence under AU colors are not new; the so-called SADR reconnaissance unit was, in fact, controlled by Algerian officers from the beginning.
Not a New Crisis, But an Old Ambiguity Resurfacing
The tension is not new. SADR’s 1984 admission into the AU was always controversial-less a legal endorsement of statehood than a symbolic gesture aligned with Cold War-era liberation politics. The Polisario remains a non-state paramilitary movement, armed and supported by the Algerian military establishment. Internal documents from the founding of NARC in 2005, including reports shared with foreign defense attachés, confirm that Algeria effectively controlled SADR’s so-called “reconnaissance unit.”
Morocco, which quit the OAU in protest in 1984, only returned to the AU in 2017-partly to counter Algeria’s influence and lobby against SADR’s presence. While Morocco is excluded from NARC due to its dispute with Algeria and the unresolved Western Sahara question, it has instead sought deeper integration with ECOWAS, West Africa’s security bloc, with EU support for its peacekeeping capabilities.
SADR’s participation in NARC has always been diplomatically fragile. Egypt and Tunisia never recognized SADR’s sovereignty, but accepted its inclusion in 2005, likely as a symbolic concession to Algerian leadership. Over the years, this contradiction was managed quietly, with SADR representatives kept at arm’s length. But recent developments suggest a change. Egypt’s withdrawal from the 2024 exercise marks a shift from passive discomfort to active rejection. Mauritania, which previously maintained recognition and neutrality on the Western Sahara issue, has now aligned more visibly with Morocco and avoided direct interaction with the Polisario, signaling a major shift in its stance on the issue, possibly retracting its recognition.
This week’s developments do not mark the onset of a new conflict, but rather the reawakening of a structural ambiguity that has been in AU institutions since 2005. At its heart is the unresolved tension between the AU’s institutional recognition of the SADR and the lack of bilateral recognition by key regional actors. How should the AU proceed when regional engagements clash with the political red lines of its own members?
The inclusion of Polisario fighters-under AU colors-in military drills hosted by Algeria brings that fault line into sharper focus. This is even more problematic as Polisario has publicly released video statements threatening attacks on civilians and economic targets.
Egypt and Mauritania Withdrawal is a golden opportunity for Morocco to Challenge SADR’s Status in the AU
The dual withdrawal by Egypt and Mauritania from NARC presents a strategic opening for Morocco to launch a broader campaign to delegitimize the SADR within African institutions. This coordinated move may lay the groundwork for pressure on the AU to initiate institutional reforms, particularly regarding the legal framework of NARC and the eligibility criteria for participation in regional military structures when member-state recognition is contested. What begins as a procedural clarification, whether an AU-recognized entity can engage in joint initiatives with countries that do not diplomatically recognize it, could escalate into a wider challenge to the SADR’s membership in the AU. As the AU remains the only international organization recognizing SADR as a state, any shift in consensus among influential members like Egypt or Mauritania could catalyze a formal policy review. This trajectory may converge with the 80th UN General Assembly session on September 9, 2025, coinciding with the 50th anniversary of Morocco’s Green March, where the potential adoption of a UN resolution acknowledging Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara could trigger alignment pressure within the AU. Whether through suspension mechanisms or political stasis, the AU would be forced to confront the contradiction, potentially redefining its internal policies on disputed entities.
Abderrahmane Fares.
