Exclusive Investigation: Gara Djebilet’s Truth and Lies

Exclusive Investigation: Gara Djebilet’s Truth and Lies

History Repeats Itself: the same Chinese Company that fueled the East–West Highway corruption fiasco is back with South-North Gara Djebilet Railway.
Gara Djebilet lies deep in the Algerian desert, promising to transform the country’s iron-ore aspirations by way of a headline-grabbing 950 km railway linking one of North Africa’s largest deposits to coastal ports. Yet this grand vision is overshadowed by troubling realities. In our investigation, we reveal that Algeria’s US$11 billion megaproject—celebrated as a national triumph—hides a high-stakes gamble fueled by flawed economics, subservience to Chinese geostrategy, and the regime’s hunger for a lasting legacy. What are hailed as “world-class reserves” are in fact saddled with heavy phosphorus content, leaving Algeria dependent on Chinese buyers who accept low-grade ore at bargain-basement prices. Behind the flashy talk of “record-breaking trains,” we found a nest of exorbitant contracts with Belt and Road contractors, mirroring the corruption-plagued East–West Highway scheme and placing Algeria on the brink of a crippling debt trap masked as modern development.

Amid the official fanfare, political and geostrategic forces move in the background. Algerian leaders frame Gara Djebilet as a new cornerstone of industrial prosperity, yet it increasingly appears tied to China’s Belt and Road ambitions—echoing the controversies that surrounded the East–West Highway built by the same Chinese state-run behemoth, CRCC. Accusations of corruption, inflated budgets, and haphazard planning still linger around that earlier project, igniting fears that this new railway could follow a similar course. The plan also conspicuously spurns existing, cost-effective railways in neighboring Mauritania, whose iron-ore route already links to the Atlantic. This decision points to Beijing’s strategy of securing resource flows and deepening its African presence, often at the expense of common-sense economics. Probing deeper, we see how Algeria risks entangling itself in a single-buyer arrangement, where China’s leverage over pricing and provisioning specialized treatments like dephosphorization leaves an unbalanced and potentially perilous partnership.

Drawing on satellite imagery and confidential financial data shared by sources close to the project, we unravel why this venture discards straightforward logistics in favor of crafting a redundant, Chinese-controlled route across harsh terrain. Algerian authorities tout “industrial transformation,” but our analysis suggests that even if the railway becomes fully operational, hauling substandard ore more than 900 km could burn through any profit. China, meanwhile, walks away with a steady stream of cheap iron ore and an outlet for its surplus rail technology—a lopsided arrangement that feels like modern-day colonial extraction.

Behind the triumphant rhetoric of “record-breaking trains” and “world-class reserves,” serious doubts surround Gara Djebilet’s viability. Transporting inferior ore such great distances is inherently expensive, and many global steelmakers spurn high-phosphorus feedstock because it weakens finished steel. European buyers, facing strict environmental and quality targets, are all but out of reach—leaving China as the project’s only real market. A drop in iron-ore prices below the point needed to offset massive transport and processing costs could wipe out the mine’s margins. In the worst-case scenario, Algeria will have invested billions in an immense infrastructure that neither meets local needs nor establishes a firm position in high-end global markets. Stripped of its hype, the Gara Djebilet project lays bare the intense interplay of politics, grandiose promises, and unbending economic realities, reminding everyone that success in iron-ore mining depends on two unshakable factors: geography and purity.

SNTF General Manager Adj Bouaouni told Echorouk News that Algeria has launched the construction of a 950 km railway to transport iron ore from the Gara Djebilet mine to Béchar, with a massive train stretching 2.2 km and comprising 177 wagons, making it the second-longest ore transport train globally after Mauritania’s Zouerate-Nouadhibou route. The project, initiated in November 2023, is divided into three sections, with national and Chinese companies handling different segments. The railway is expected to be completed within 30 months, with an annual transport capacity of 50 million tons using eight daily freight trains. To support operations, Algeria plans to recruit and train personnel for railway maintenance and logistics, modernize the national rail network, and invest $3.5 billion to increase freight transport capacity from 6 million to 100 million tons by 2040. Additionally, a related 450 km railway from Djebel Onk to Annaba is in development, and authorities aim to integrate this infrastructure into a broader mining and transport network. The SNTF (Algerian National Railways) also plans to acquire 400 passenger cars and 600 locomotives to expand its services, while a specialized rail-laying train is being used to expedite track construction. Despite the project’s ambitious scale, officials insist that there are no major obstacles and emphasize its role in fostering economic growth and job creation, particularly in southern Algeria.

The Gara Djebilet mine was discovered in 1952 by French geologist Pierre Gevin. Gara Djebilet is located at GPS coordinates 26.713716, -7.4754. It is 1168 km from Nouadhibhou (Mauritania), 913 km from Dakhla, 463 km from Agadir, 1194 km from Oran, 1249 km from Mostaganem, 590 km from Laayoune, and 672 km from Zouerate.

The Gara Djebilet mine has been unexploited since Algeria’s independence, and trials to exploit it have failed since 1972 under Houari Boumediene. In a significant move toward regional cooperation, Algeria signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Morocco on June 15, 1972, and subsequently entered into a joint agreement to develop the mine, an initiative endorsed by Hassan II and Houari Boumediene. The agreement provided for the exploitation of the Algerian mine and the transportation of iron through Morocco, using its access to the ocean; however, the project was never fully implemented.

At the time under the agreement, both states established a joint Algerian-Moroccan company (S.A.M.) tasked with extracting, transporting, and marketing the iron ore. Plans were made to build a railway linking Gara Djebilet to a Moroccan Atlantic port for export. Both nations committed to sharing extraction and infrastructure costs, with financing to be secured through loans and state guarantees, and S.A.M. was granted a 60-year operational mandate. To incentivize investment and ensure workforce stability, the treaty also provided for customs exemptions, tax incentives, and employment opportunities for both Algerian and Moroccan workers.

The commercialization and revenue-sharing model was to be overseen by a joint governing board, with disputes resolved through arbitration under the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Geneva, establishing a structured framework for long-term cooperation. A referendum held on June 27, 1976, approved a national charter proposed by the FLN, confirming the construction of the railway. Extending over more than 1,500 km, the railway will connect the Gara Djebilet iron mine to the western metallurgical complex, creating a vital axis that will underpin the development of the country’s western region along its entire north-south extent.

Iron Ore Industry

The iron ore industry is the world’s second largest commodity market after crude oil and is essential to steel production, relying primarily on two types of ore: hematite and magnetite. Hematite, known for its rich iron content with an Fe grade typically ranging between 40% and 70% depending on the deposit, is often called Direct Shipping Ore (DSO) because it can be easily mined and beneficiated using simple crushing and screening processes before being shipped to steel producers. Recognizable by its characteristic red, rusty hue, hematite is predominantly mined from regions such as Western Australia’s Pilbara and Brazil’s Carajas mine, with major global producers like BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, and Vale, along with significant contributions from South Africa’s Kumba Resources. Although hematite’s minimal processing makes it a convenient resource, it often contains impurities that can be costly for steelmakers to remove, and as a result, the final product is usually sold either as lumps or fines—the former being preferred for direct feeding into blast furnaces, while the latter must be sintered to mitigate the smothering effect that would otherwise occur in the furnace.

Australia and Brazil are the undisputed world leaders in Iron Ore

Iron ore is the lifeblood of steel production—nearly every skyscraper, bridge, or car relies on it—and a handful of countries control this critical global market. Australia and Brazil dominate the trade, supplying over 70% of the world’s exports combined, with Australia alone contributing 56% of internationally traded iron ore. These giants aren’t just rich in deposits; they’ve perfected the logistics to ship massive quantities efficiently, from Australia’s sun-scorched Outback mines to Brazil’s Amazonian pits. While around 50 countries mine iron ore, none match their scale: in 2019, Australia extracted 919 million tons and Brazil 405 million tons, dwarfing the U.S., which produced just 46.9 million tons despite sitting on vast reserves of lower-grade ore in regions like Michigan’s Lake Superior. Prices swing dramatically based on demand and global events—surges like the 2021 peak of $212 per ton (eight times higher than 2015 lows) reflect sudden supply crunches or soaring steel needs, though costs later stabilized to around $133 per ton by early 2022. For context, nearly all mined iron ore fuels steelmaking, linking its fortunes directly to construction booms, manufacturing, and even economic recovery efforts. While the U.S. holds enough iron ore to theoretically supply itself for centuries, much of it requires costly processing, leaving Australia and Brazil to remain the undisputed titans of a market where geography, resource quality, and industrial muscle dictate who leads.

The Port Advantage: How Proximity to Water Decides Who Wins in the Iron Ore Industry, and Gara Djebilet Is Far From The Water

The iron ore industry is a high-stakes game where location—specifically, how close mines are to ports or railways—can make or break a company’s success. Countries like Australia and Brazil dominate not just because they have huge iron ore deposits, but because their mines are near coasts, slashing the cost of shipping. Australia’s vast, sunbaked Pilbara region, for example, uses its own railways and ports to funnel ore directly onto giant ships bound for China, the world’s top buyer. Brazil’s Amazonian mines rely on rivers and railways to quickly get ore to Atlantic ports. These setups keep costs low, allowing these giants to sell at prices smaller players, including Algeria can’t match.

Starting an iron ore mine isn’t easier either. It requires enormous upfront spending—billions for digging equipment, processing plants, and infrastructure like roads or railways just to connect a mine to a port. This financial wall keeps most newcomers out, leaving the market to big companies (or governments) with deep pockets. Even then, geography plays tricks: a mine tucked deep in a remote area faces crippling costs to truck or rail ore hundreds of kilometers, while a coastal operation might only need a short train ride to a port. Some companies get creative, like using slurry pipelines (imagine pumping ore mixed with water through a tube) to dodge rail fees, or building mines near ice-free Arctic ports to save on seasonal shipping delays.

The way the Iron Ore industry works is that it operates on Freight On Board (FOB) basis, meaning when iron ore is sold, the seller typically covers costs up to loading the cargo onto a ship—including mining, storage, and getting it to the port. Buyers then pay for the sea voyage, insurance, and unloading. This means that if your mine is far inland (as it is the case of Gara Djebilet, 460km east of Agadir, 590km east of El Marsa, 900km east of Dakhla, 1200km south of Oran, 1100km Nouadhibhou), you’re stuck with pricier rail fees, cutting into profits. Australian mines profit from their proximity to Asia—shorter trips to China mean cheaper shipping, while Brazilian ore travels farther but finds an edge supplying Europe. Costs also hinge on ore quality: high-grade material requires less processing, making it cheaper to sell. Add in volatile fuel prices, environmental rules, and labor costs, and you’ve got a business where tiny savings per ton decide who thrives.

While this might not be noticed at first glance by non-experts and general readership, we cannot highlight it enough for the mainstream opinion: in the iron ore business world, geography isn’t just a detail, it’s the ultimate advantage which will determine if you succeed or fail. Companies that master logistics (such as the Australian, Brazilian, South African, Canadian), hug coastlines, or innovate around transport hurdles can outlast rivals. Meanwhile, countries blessed with ore-rich, coastal landscapes (like Australia and Brazil) sit firmly in the driver’s seat, while landlocked regions face steep climbs to compete (that will include Algeria). It’s a reminder that in global industries, sometimes success comes down to being in the right place—with the right infrastructure—at the right time.

Can a train run 950 km in the Desert from the Gara Djebilet mine to Béchar

Long freight trains do indeed operate successfully in desert environments around the world, proving that sand and dunes, while intimidating and scary, do not constitute an insurmountable obstacle. Rail lines in Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Australia demonstrate that windblown sand can be controlled through a combination of periodic track inspections, graded or elevated rail beds, and strategically placed barriers to redirect drifting dunes. Specialized equipment—including plows and brushes—helps clear built-up sand, while locomotives, wagons, and braking systems are carefully designed to withstand both extreme heat and the abrasive effects of desert conditions. Some of the planet’s longest desert trains—such as Mauritania’s 3 km-long “Iron Train,” the 4.1 km Sishen-Saldanha line in South Africa, and Australia’s mega-trains, have proven that engineering can keep these heavy-haul operations reliable, even in the harshest climates. In Mauritania, for instance, railway crews protect the Zouerate-Nouadhibou line from shifting dunes through frequent grading work and selective embankment construction, while Australia’s Pilbara network deploys automated sensors and reinforced railcars for seamless performance in the Outback. It must be noted that the Gara Djebilet to Béchar long railway is not an Algerian project, but a Chinese one. The Algerian authorities have enlisted the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative firm China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC) , the same entity linked to the East-West Highway corruption scandal and blacklisted by the U.S. Treasury Department.

Screenshot of a Google Images search for ‘Iron Train,’ showcasing the Mauritanian iron ore train as a popular tourist attraction. The results highlight adventure travelers riding atop the train through the desert

Iron Ore Grade Is King, and Gara Djebilet Is Low Grade Undesirable Iron Ore

Imagine baking a cake with a recipe that demands pure sugar—only to find your bag of sugar has sand mixed in. Suddenly, you’re sifting, picking out grit, and burning more energy to salvage the recipe. This is the daily reality for steelmakers working with low-grade iron ore. The value of iron ore isn’t just about how much iron it contains, but how pure that iron is. The fewer unwanted “ingredients” like phosphorus, silica, or aluminum mixed in, the less time, fuel, and effort it takes to turn ore into steel—and the more money everyone saves.

The value of iron ore isn’t just about quantity—it’s about quality. Higher-grade ore, with a greater concentration of iron and fewer impurities like phosphorus, silica, and alumina, is far more desirable for steelmakers. This isn’t arbitrary: every percentage point of purity directly impacts costs. For example, steel plants using high-grade ore (62% iron vs. 58%) save money in two ways. First, they pay less to ship “waste rock” since each ton contains more usable iron. Second, fewer impurities mean less energy is needed to refine the ore in blast furnaces, reducing fuel and labor costs. These savings add up fast, with purer ore often fetching $20–$25 more per ton than lower-grade material.

At the Gara Djebilet deposit, the iron content sits around 56.58%, but the ore is burdened by high levels of silica (7.98%), alumina (7.09%), and phosphorus (0.92%), all of which drive up costs and reduce the overall appeal of the material. These impurities weaken steel if not removed, but stripping them out of Gara Djebilet’s ore is extraordinarily difficult. The ore’s unique structure—a mix of tiny, layered iron-rich “beads” (oolites) surrounded by phosphate minerals—traps the phosphorus deep within, like a hard candy shell hiding a bitter center. Traditional processing methods, such as crushing and magnetic separation, can’t break this bond effectively.

To make matters worse, high phosphorus isn’t just an annoyance—it’s a dealbreaker. Steelmakers avoid ore with phosphorus levels above 0.1% because it makes steel brittle, risking structural failures in everything from car frames to skyscrapers. Cleaning Gara Djebilet’s ore would require advanced (and expensive) techniques, such as chemical leaching or high-intensity roasting, which most buyers aren’t willing to subsidize. Without affordable solutions, massive deposits like this often remain unused, despite their size, because purer alternatives exist elsewhere.

This dynamic explains why the iron ore trade revolves around a few mining giants. Countries like Australia and Brazil dominate not only because they have vast reserves, and excellent railway to port infrastructure, but because their ores are naturally purer and easier to process. For steelmakers, paying a premium for high-grade ore is still cheaper than battling stubborn impurities—which is why “Grade is King” remains the industry’s unshakable rule, and for the EU, it will buy iron ore from Brazil, Australia, and Sweden (high-quality sources). Gara Djebilet’s high phosphorus content will stand no chance compared to Australian or Brazilian ore.

Gara Djebilet Will Be Expensive and Marginally Economically Viable

The development of Algeria’s Gâra Djebilet iron ore deposit faces significant challenges due to its high phosphorus content (0.7–1%), which requires costly and complex dephosphorization to produce marketable ore. While iron ore prices surged to a record $212 per ton in mid-2021—eight times higher than 2015 lows—they later stabilized around $133 per ton by early 2022. Based on historical pricing, the deposit’s 1.35 billion tons of extractable iron could generate between $91.77 billion (at conservative estimates) and $288.42 billion (optimistically) over a projected 101-year extraction period. However, stiff competition from Australia, Brazil, and Guinea’s Simandou reserves—with their higher-quality ore—poses a hurdle, compounded by Algeria’s need to invest billions in infrastructure. A 750 km railroad to Béchar alone is projected to cost $7.5–11 billion, with port upgrades and specialized trains adding further upfront costs. Even with infrastructure in place, the project’s viability hinges on iron prices: at $70/ton, Algeria would net just $9.96 billion over a century, barely breaking even. Moderate prices of $120/ton could yield $75.51 billion, while a repeat of 2021’s $220/ton spike would unlock $206.61 billion in profit. Ultimately, profitability requires sustained prices above $120/ton to offset phosphorus-related processing expenses, logistical hurdles in desert conditions, and fierce global competition, making the project a high-risk, high-reward endeavor for Algeria.

Deconstructing Lies and Official Propaganda

Is Gara Djebilet Algeria the largest iron ore reserve in the world ?

No. Algerian authorities lie.

Gara Djebilet, with an estimated 2.37 billion tonnes of ore at around 57% iron content, is among the largest iron deposits in North Africa but pales in comparison to the world’s true giants. Just in December 2024 geologists uncovered an iron deposit of a scale that none had previously documented with an estimated 55 billion metric tons. Yes, 55 BILLION metric tons. Even scientists suggest that entire chapters of mineral formation and large-scale geological processes may need rewriting due to this historical discovery. Australia’s Pilbara region, for instance, contains over 40 billion tonnes of ore (at 55–62% iron), while Brazil’s Carajás Mine holds 7.2 billion tonnes at about 65% grade. Russia’s Kursk Magnetic Anomaly similarly exceeds 25 billion tonnes, and even Guinea’s Simandou, at 4 billion tonnes near 65% iron, nearly doubles the extractable iron of Gara Djebilet. Hence, while this Algerian deposit boasts regional significance, with roughly 1.35 billion tonnes of iron metal, it is nowhere near the top globally. Claims presenting it as the largest iron ore reserve in the world are therefore overstated, though Gara Djebilet undeniably remains important for Algeria’s development and the broader North African iron industry.

“Due to come on stream in July 2022, it is considered to be one of the largest iron ore mines in the world. – Iron ore reserves are estimated at around 3.6 billion tonnes, of which 1.7 billion tonnes can be mined, ranking it 8th in the world, just ahead of the USA, which has a reserve of around 3 billion tonnes of iron.

Lie.

In July 2022, Algeria announced a symbolic “launch,” but no full-scale mining or exports began. By early 2025, production remains in preliminary stages, and full infrastructure (railway, processing) has just started. “Entering exploitation” means nothing if extraction, transport, and exports are not yet operational. It is NOT one of the “largest mines” in the world, not even in the top 20. It is not yet fully operational, without any infrastructure.

Largest Iron Ore Mines In The World: Algeria Is not even in the top 20, dominated Largely by Australia and Brazil. Contenders are Canada, Russia, South Africa, Sweden.

World Largest Iron Ore Reserves Australie, Bresil, Russie, Chine, Inde as of January 2024, source: U.S. Geological Society.

List of Main Global Iron Ore Producers in 2024

Adj Bouaouni’s claim that Algeria’s proposed 2.2 km iron ore train would be the second-longest in the world after Mauritania’s, is a LIE

Adj Bouaouni’s claim that Algeria’s proposed 2.2 km iron ore train would be the second-longest in the world after Mauritania’s Zouerate-Nouadhibou route is factually incorrect, misleading, or intentionally dismissive of well-documented global rail operations. As of February 2025, multiple longer trains exist, listed in descending order of length:

List of the longest heavy haul trains in the world: Datong-Qinhuangdao Coal Train (China) – 2.6 km long, 210 wagons. Leigh Creek Coal Train (Australia) – 2.8 km long, 161 wagons. Rio Tinto Iron Ore Train (Australia) – 2.5–3 km long, typically over 240 wagons. BHP Iron Ore Train (Australia, typical length) – 2.8 km long, 268 wagons. Fortescue Metals Group Train (Australia) – 2.8 km long, around 270 wagons. Mauritania Railway (Mauritania) – up to 3 km long, 200–210 wagons. QNS&L Iron Ore Train (Canada) – 3 km long, 240 wagons. Carajás Railway (Brazil) – 3 km long, 330 wagons. VLI Grain/Pulp Train (Brazil) – approximately 3.2 km long, 160 wagons. Sishen-Saldanha Iron Ore Train (South Africa) – 4.1 km long, 342 wagons. CSX “Monster Train” (USA) – 4.5 km long, over 200 wagons. BHP Iron Ore Train (Australia, Guinness World Record) – 7.3 km long, 682 wagons (2001).

Algeria’s proposed 2.2 km train is not the second-longest; it is not even in the top five. Whether Bouaouni’s statement stems from incompetence, propaganda, or deliberate misinformation, it disregards established industry benchmarks and misleads the public. This claim is not just an exaggeration—it is an outright fabrication designed to create an illusion of industrial prowess detached from reality.

“The industrial exploitation of Gara Djebilet ore envisages production of 2 to 3 million tonnes of ore per year in the first stage (2022-2025), then 40 to 50 million tonnes/year from 2026 onwards”.

Lie. L’Algérie n’est pas un producteur conséquent, But Algeria is an importer of such mineral commodities as iron ore and iron and steel products; it was the world’s 10th-ranked net importer of steel products in 2019. 40–50M tonnes/year by 2026 is fantasy—no supporting infrastructure. Mauritania’s Iron Ore Railway (~700 km) which has been operational since 1963 moves ~17M tonnes/year. Simandou (Guinea) expects 100M tonnes/year by 2030—but with full Chinese investment, a new railway, and deepwater ports. Algeria has none of these yet. Authorities have announced in the first week of February 2025 that 30 months will be fully operational. Pure propaganda—50M tonnes/year by 2026 is physically impossible.

Production and Deadline Lies: Will Algeria Be A Leader in the Metal Industry ? No.

The industrial exploitation of Gâra Djebilet ore begins in 2022 with a planned production of 2 to 3 million tonnes of ore per year in a first stage (2022-2025), then 40 to 50 million tonnes/year from 2026.

“The train will be in service within 30 months”

Anything stating that it will be ready by 2026 or in less than five years. If Algeria secures full Chinese investment and builds rail and mines in parallel, 2035 is possible. Without investment—and as is known, Algerian delays in major infrastructure projects push the date to 2040 or later—any claim of full operation by 2026 is pure propaganda. If official claims ignore the time needed for railroads, processing plants, and port infrastructure, they are propaganda rather than a real industrial plan.

Military Regime of Algiers Propaganda

Disturbing discoveries and political ulterior motives

China, which currently imports 79% of its iron ore from Australia and 19% from Brazil, has aggressively diversified its sourcing amid diplomatic tensions with Canberra, securing deals in Sierra Leone (Tonkolili: 13.7 billion tonnes), Guinea (Simandou: 120 million tonnes/year), and now Algeria. The latter emerged as a key partner during President Tebboune’s July 2023 visit to Beijing, where he announced $36 billion in Chinese investments targeting Algerian industry, technology, transport, and agriculture—framed as deepening “strong and comprehensive relations.” Central to this pact is the China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC), a state-owned enterprise building the 950 km railway from Gara Djebilet to Béchar. This project, ostensibly linking the mine to Algeria’s national rail network via the Béchar Industrial Zone, is riddled with contradictions. Despite Algerian authorities touting it as a “sovereign achievement,” the ore’s fatal flaw—its phosphorus content of 0.8–1.5%, eight times higher than the 0.1% threshold for most global steelmakers—renders it commercially toxic to Western and Indian buyers. Only China, with its willingness to absorb low-grade ore for strategic leverage, remains a viable buyer.

First Anomaly: The Mauritania Bypass

Algeria’s refusal to collaborate with Morocco, given their hostile relations, is understandable. However, the deliberate exclusion of Mauritania—whose 700 km “Iron Train” railway from Zouérate to Nouadhibou port sits just 670 km south of Gara Djebilet—exposes the project’s geopolitical subservience to China. A rational, cost-effective strategy would integrate into Mauritania’s existing infrastructure, leveraging its six-decade operational experience to slash transit costs and boost regional trade. Instead, Algeria is investing €3.1+ billion in a redundant CRCC-controlled railway north to Béchar, a route requiring treacherous mountainous terrain crossings and prolonged timelines. This choice blatantly contradicts Algiers’ professed pan-Africanism, revealing a grim reality: the railway’s primary purpose is not Algerian development but entrenching China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) footprint. By isolating itself from regional networks, Algeria effectively transforms its Sahara into a Chinese-controlled corridor, sacrificing sovereignty under the veneer of “resource nationalism.”

Second Anomaly: The Mirage of Economic Viability

The Gara Djebilet ore’s inferior quality and remote location render it economically precarious. Transporting it requires a 950 km rail journey to Béchar, followed by another 1,000 km to Oran’s port—a detail omitted from official statements that instead highlight a vague “semi-processing station” in Béchar. Europe’s strict low-phosphorus standards and ESG protocols disqualify the ore entirely, while India, already reliant on high-grade Australian supplies, has no incentive to buy. This leaves China as the sole buyer, granting Beijing monopoly power to dictate terms: analysts speculate Algeria is trading ore at subsidized rates—or even gratis—in exchange for CRCC’s rail financing. Such a quid pro quo, negotiated during Tebboune’s 2023 summit with Xi Jinping, mirrors the disastrous East-West Highway project, another CRCC-led endeavor marred by corruption and U.S. Treasury sanctions. Despite official claims of “record-breaking” reserves (1.35 billion tonnes of extractable ore, projected for 101 years of production), revenue forecasts remain bleak: $900 million annually in conservative estimates, peaking at $2.85 billion under ideal conditions—figures dwarfed by the project’s $7.5–$11 billion rail construction costs, excluding port upgrades and processing plants.

GARA Djebilet WILL BE FOR TEBBOUNE WHAT THE EAST-WEST HIGHWAY WAS FOR BOUTEFLIKA

Much like Bouteflika’s East-West Highway—a CRCC-built project infamous for kickbacks and inflated costs—Gara Djebilet risks becoming a monument to Chinese influence rather than Algerian progress. CRCC’s involvement, coupled with Algeria’s insistence on bypassing pragmatic partnerships like Mauritania’s railway, signals a recurrence of the same opaque dealmaking that plagued prior infrastructure ventures. Investigative journalists such as Hichem Aboud and Amir Boukhors have already flagged entities like SOMIFER (Société des Mines de Fer d’Algérie), SNTF (Algerian Railways), and COSIDER (the Algerian civil engineering firm partnering with CRCC) as potential hubs for financial mismanagement.

The project’s financial and geopolitical pitfalls are compounded by its propagandistic framing. Algerian authorities laud it as a “transformational” job creator, yet even optimistic employment projections scarcely dent national youth unemployment rates nearing 30%. Meanwhile, the regime’s decision to prioritize a Chinese-controlled railway—over regional collaboration or ore quality upgrades—betrays a deeper malaise: an economy clinging to extractive ventures at the cost of sovereignty. Just as the East-West Highway symbolized Bouteflika’s cronyism, Gara Djebilet embodies Tebboune’s transactional governance—a project less about ore than about political survival, where Algeria pays Beijing in resources for the illusion of progress.

Abderrahmane Fares