War Crimes and Mass Graves: Investigation into General Aït Ouarabi’s Dark Past

The appointment of General Abdelkader Aït Ouarabi, also known as General “Hassan”, to lead Algeria’s domestic intelligence agency (DGSI) confirms a strategic shift in the country’s security posture. Unofficial and propaganda frames his return as a corrective measure in the context of deteriorating relations with France and the failed kidnappings of Amir Boukhors and Hichem Aboud, a response to perceived shortcomings of his predecessor, General Abdelkader Haddad.

However, the replacement of the internal intelligence chief -not the foreign intelligence head- points to different priorities. If the regime’s objective were to resolve the diplomatic standoff with Paris, the logical move would have been to replace -at least- General Fethi Rochdi Moussaoui, head of the DGDSE, who remains under an international arrest warrant and is widely considered responsible for the intelligence failures abroad. Instead, the government removed the head of internal intelligence, a move that signals a clear prioritization of domestic consolidation over foreign affairs. This internal focus coincides with two major legislative shifts: first, the revised Code of Criminal Procedure, which expands surveillance and detention powers, and second, Law on General Mobilization, which allows the executive to activate security and reserve forces without parliamentary oversight. These measures create the legal conditions for expanded internal repression and terrorist operations inside Algeria. General Abdelkader Aït Ouarabi’s return operationalizes this vision, and we explain why below.

General Abdelkader Aït Ouarabi, also known as General Hassan

General Abdelkader Aït Ouarabi, who is 78 years old, was a senior figure under General Mohamed Mediène, head of the former DRS. He led SCORAT (Coordination Service for Anti-Terror Intelligence) and GIS (Special Intervention Group). While Abdelkader Haddad -his predecessor at the DGSI- was known for his erratic behavior, impulsive decisions, and a violent temper that made him both feared and mocked within security circles, Aït Ouarabi is a different breed entirely. Haddad was seen by many as a brutish executor: a blunt instrument of repression who lacked strategic vision, spoke no French, could not write a complete report, and relied on raw brutality rather than tradecraft. Hassan, by contrast, is not only fluent in French but also trained in elite military academies, with field experience spanning Mali, Chad, Senegal, Angola. His record includes decades of covert operations: infiltration of jihadist networks, arms rerouting schemes, and psychological destabilization campaigns across multiple countries. His leadership of SCORAT positioned him as a master of deniable warfare: the kind of operator who understood proxy management, plausible deniability, and the dark logic of false-flag tactics. His reappointment is not a bureaucratic shuffle-it is the calculated reinstatement of a strategic mind steeped in counterinsurgency, intelligence manipulation, and state-sponsored ambiguity.

This murky past in covert dealings with terrorist networks drags behind it a bloody record. Investigative documents and testimonies converge on several key operations: his leadership role in the DRS’s logistical support to Islamist insurgents in northern Mali (2012-2013); the deployment of controlled cells in Tunisia’s Mount Chaambi (2013-2014); and his management of SCORAT and GIS -both units deeply involved in the clandestine infiltration of armed networks, including arming the Tiguentourine terrorists, Libyan arms trafficking and the operation of the Tamouret Camp.

Tamouret: General Abdelkader Aït Ouarabi’s Secret Execution and Training Camp

The Tamouret Camp, publicly presented as an “Al Qaeda” training facility, was in fact operated by Algeria’s intelligence service, the DRS. Situated in Oued Tamouret (Oued Tamrit) within Tassili National Park, and less than 400 kilometers from the Tiguentourine gas complex. The camp was used to forcibly recruit, indoctrinate, and train marginalized youths to carry out violent acts in Algerian communities with which they had no affiliation. After completing their missions, or in cases of disobedience, these recruits were typically executed.

Oued Tamouret (Oued Tamrit area, GPS coordinates in this Google map) in the Tassili National Park, is less than 400 kms from the Tiguentourine gas facility near In Amenas where a secret DRS camp was led by General Abdelkader Aït Ouarabi. Some of the burial sites were identified, with location details passed to a local contact who was able to locate, partially exhume, and photograph the shallow graves.

Training at the camp included sniper tactics and throat-slitting. Prisoners, including army officers, conscripts, civilians, and common criminals, many from the ranks of the forcibly disappeared (“les disparus”), were transferred by the Algerian army and DRS to be executed as part of the training process. One witness, identified as “Bashir,” claimed to have witnessed approximately 180 killings during his seven-month detention at the site. Bodies were buried in shallow graves by designated disposal teams; some of these graves have since been located and examined.

Photo of a partially exhumed tomb at Tamouret (Oued Tamrit area, GPS coordinates in this Google map). A DRS mass grave, under General Abdelkader Aït Ouarabi leadership.

Individuals involved in the Tamouret camp included Abdelhamid Abou Zaïd, who oversaw the facility as its commander, and Abdullah al-Furathi, who served as the main trainer. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, responsible for logistics, visited the site approximately every two weeks. Mohamed Lamine Bouchneb, later identified as one of the lead perpetrators of the 2013 In Amenas gas plant attack, was a frequent presence at the camp and was regularly observed in the company of Abou Zaïd, Belmokhtar, and both army and DRS personnel. Yahia Djouadi was also reported as a recurrent visitor. High-ranking DRS and military officers maintained a sustained presence at the camp, at times visiting almost daily. Among them were General Rachid “Attafi” Lallali, then head of the DRS’ External Security Directorate (DDSE), and General Abdelkader Aït Ouarabi, both of whom were documented as having personally visited the site.

Beyond its function as a training and execution site, Tamouret also served as a registration center where the DRS recorded the identities of recruits, including photographs and DNA samples. These records were reportedly sent to Algiers and shared with U.S. and British intelligence services. This arrangement may explain how Western agencies obtained lists of hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals subsequently identified as Al Qaeda operatives, and why so many attacks were publicly reported as “foiled.”

Investigators state that serious crimes against humanity were committed at Tamouret site (Oued Tamrit area, GPS coordinates in this Google map), with the full awareness –and likely complicity– of certain Western intelligence agencies. The camp’s existence has remained a tightly guarded secret, essential to preserving both Algerian and Western interests in the region. It was closed down around 2009 and moved to the Tigharghar Mountains of northern Mali.

Tunisia, Libya, In Amenas: General Aït Ouarabi’s Hand Behind Covert Operations

In 2015, despite being officially in retreat and “retired” at the time, he was dragged amid a power struggle between Said Bouteflika/Ahmed Gaid Salah and Mohamed Mediene’s network. His name came back every time the Tiguentourine hostage crisis was mentioned. The Tiguentourine crisis, also known as the In Amenas gas plant attack, was a hostage situation which started on 16 th January 2013 and was resolved on January 19, 2013. During the siege 39 people died (10 Japanese, 8 Filipino, 6 British, 5 Norwegian, 3 Americans, 2 Malaysian, 2 Romanian, 1 Colombian, 1 French, 1 Algerian), and 29 terrorists died. Aït Ouarabi was arrested, tried in secret, and sentenced, not for his most serious suspected actions, but on lesser administrative charges such as “disobedience” and “document destruction.”. That was the second time he was facing justice, after the first time, where his indictment was halted after a direct U.S. intervention and mediation with Bouteflika and Ahmed Gaïd Salah.

The power struggle which led to his arrest, revealed a succession and a track record of horrific crimes and terrorist operations. One of them, the Chaambi operations in Tunisia, launched in late 2012, these offensives targeted jihadist cells entrenched in the mountainous Jebel Chaambi near the Algerian border. During the final phase of General Abdelkader Aït Ouarabi’s tenure as head of SCORAT, which ended with his official “retirement” on January 13, 2014, Tunisian forces suffered a series of IED attacks, ambushes, and targeted assassinations. Around early 2014, 14 members of Tunisia’s military and national guard had been killed and dozens more injured. The armed groups, including Katibat Okba Ibn Nafaâ, operated across the border with Algerian support and used logistical supply routes tied to arms convoys from Libya. Tunisian intelligence seized communication devices and SIM cards in the Chaambi zone that were traced to Algerian security networks, specifically DRS channels linked to Abdelkader Aït Ouarabi’s unit. An analysis of these SIM cards revealed communications with DRS officials in Algiers, including their phone numbers and nicknames. The Tunisian army passed this information to U.S. intelligence, which then turned to the Algerian military, perhaps inadvertently giving Gaïd Salah even more ammunition to pursue the DRS.

Another operation, in Libya this time, which according to the “official” version (propagated by Ilyas Aribi, also known as Abdou Semmar), the SCORAT unit under General Abdelkader Aït Ouarabi allegedly intercepted Libyan weapons –particularly two man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS)– as part of a covert mission to trace arms trafficking routes from post-Gaddafi Libya into the Sahel. This operation, launched in late 2013, purportedly aimed to identify and dismantle transnational smuggling networks supplying groups like AQIM and Boko Haram. DRS operatives were embedded in these circuits, disguised as arms traffickers and jihadist intermediaries. The SCORAT convoy, while transporting the captured MANPADS under clandestine cover, was mistakenly intercepted by regular army units in Tamanrasset who were unaware of the operation. This incident, framed officially as a security miscommunication, became the cornerstone of the case later used against Aït Ouarabi. However, investigators state that this narrative deliberately obscures the deeper strategy: the weapons were not merely seized and neutralized-they were reintroduced into the circuit to bait further transactions and identify broader smuggling infrastructures. The operation blurred the line between intelligence gathering and active participation in the arms economy of regional insurgencies.

One might describe the operation as a heroic mission—an elite unit intercepting Libyan weapons, penetrating trafficking networks, and operating undercover to protect national security. This is a common narrative used to justify deep-cover intelligence work. However, in the field of counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence, such operations follow strict standards. Seized weapons are typically either destroyed, stored in secure military custody, or used in tightly controlled deliveries under traceable conditions. Intelligence agents may infiltrate trafficking circuits, but their goal is to map networks, identify targets, and support law enforcement or military interdiction—not to prolong or recycle the threat. In the SCORAT operation under General Aït Ouarabi, the weapons—particularly the MANPADS—were not neutralized or tracked. They were reintroduced into the black market without oversight. The operation was not coordinated with the Algerian army, leading to a near-conflict in Tamanrasset. The mission crossed the line from intelligence gathering into active participation in the regional arms economy. This is not standard counter-terrorism—it is a parallel strategy of managed instability. The SCORAT operation did not merely infiltrate or disrupt terrorist networks, it actively participated in their reproduction. The line between observation and orchestration was not crossed accidentally; it was obliterated by design.

The use of surface-to-air missiles, the reintroduction of seized weapons into black-market circuits, and the masquerading of state agents as jihadist traffickers do not constitute standard counterterrorism. They represent a doctrine of strategic destabilization. The fact that the intercepted SCORAT convoy operated without army coordination, that Tunisian intelligence linked his unit to Katibat Okba Ibn Nafaâ, and that the trial was frozen due to U.S. intervention, these are not marks of heroism but red flags of rogue operations. The Libyan operation was not an anomaly, it was part of a pattern. It ties directly to the Tamouret camp, to the In Amenas siege, and to the broader DRS practice of weaponizing proxy insurgents to shape regional dynamics. Reinstating Aït Ouarabi is not a matter of capability; it is a signal that the regime is doubling down on the very playbook that destabilized Algeria and its neighbors throughout the 2000s and 2010s.

From Accusation to Acquittal: How and Why the Aït Ouarabi Trial Was Contained and Silenced

The murky “anti-terrorist” operations led by Abdelkader Aït Ouarabi’s in Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, ended up all on Ahmed Gaïd Salah’s office. On February 8, 2014, he was arrested for the first time. While the charges were not publicly detailed at the time, leaked information and subsequent reports indicated they included extremely serious, even “treasonable,” charges such as “creating armed groups,” “retaining and withholding disclosure of weapons of war,” and “making false statements of weaponry stocks“. The charge of “creating armed groups” was understood to mean the clandestine creation of “terrorism groups” and “militant cells”. Technical charges also reportedly related to his alleged failure to properly account for weaponry covertly supplied to “terrorist groups” (Islamist insurgents) in Mali during 2012. Investigators also linked his arrest to evidence of the DRS’s involvement in supporting “terrorism” in Tunisia, specifically through SIM card evidence linking Mount Chaambi fighters to the DRS. This evidence was found by the Tunisian military, which they shared with the U.S., and in turn, ended up in Ahmed Gaïd Salah’s office.

Crucially, his arrest was perceived as part of a strategy by the Bouteflika presidency and General Gaid Salah to target and incriminate General Mediene, the long-serving head of the DRS, as Hassan was always understood to be acting on Mediene’s orders. This marked the opening salvo in a brutal internal conflict between the army and the DRS that threatened to tear the regime apart, in a context of revolutions and “arab spring”. The US directly intervened because Washington “could not afford” its key regional ally to implode through this vicious infighting. The Abdelkader Aït Ouarabi military-judicial process was abruptly halted around February 12-13, 2014, and a silence fell over Algeria regarding the case. Many reliable sources say the United States “stepped in“.

Furthermore, the US could not afford the secrets of General Abdelkader Aït Ouarabi and the DRS’ dealings with terrorist groups to fall into the public domain as a result of a purely vicious political conflict. This potential exposure was seen as highly damaging to U.S. national interest, because US intelligence services and the DRS had been working very closely-hand in glove as close allies since as early as 2002 in the war on terror in Sahel. The sources highlight that the US and Algeria, through the P2OG (Proactive Preemptive Operations Group), had immediately set about the fabrication of “false-flag” terrorist operations in the Algerian Sahara starting from 2002, with the purpose of justifying the launch of a new front in America’s Global War on Terror in Africa. General Abdelkader Aït Ouarabi was the main critical link and key player in all of them.

If secrets about Abdelkader Aït Ouarabi dealings with terrorist groups were exposed in a highly publicized trial — similar to scandals of Khalifa, Chekib Khelil’s Sonatrach, Khaled Nezzar’s war crimes — the U.S. would inevitably be seen as having been complicit in the DRS’s “false-flag” and other questionable operations conducted since 2002.

And from the U.S. perspective, the prospect of these programs being exposed in a public trial, triggered not by foreign adversaries but by a vicious domestic power struggle between the Bouteflika–Gaïd Salah axis and Mohamed Mediene’s entrenched intelligence system, was unacceptable.

The risk was that such revelations would be added to the list of the U.S’s most controversial covert engagements such as:

• Iran-Contra affair, in which U.S. officials illegally facilitated arms sales to Iran and funded Contra militias in Nicaragua;
• the CIA’s post-9/11 torture and extraordinary rendition program, involving the CIA’s network of black sites used for torture and illegal detention, exposed in the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee’s report;
• the My Lai massacre in Vietnam and its subsequent military cover-up;
• and the U.S.-backed Operation Condor, which enabled targeted assassinations and disappearances across South America.

In each of these historical episodes, the U.S. was implicated in covert violence, legal evasion, and alliances with criminal or repressive actors, all in the name of strategic interest.

The parallel with the DRS is clear: exposure of the full extent of cooperation with General Aït Ouarabi would not only damage bilateral relations, it would severely undermine the credibility of the U.S. intelligence community and its post-9/11 counterterrorism doctrine.

The U.S. aimed to prevent such disclosures, which would do far more damage to Washington than Algiers. The concern was not about General Abdelkader Aït Ouarabi guilt, but about the risk of structural exposure and the unravelling of a decade-plus of deeply intertwined, and allegedly complicit, US-DRS covert operations. A meeting reportedly took place at around the time of Abdelkader Aït Ouarabi’s first arrest at the DRS’s headquarters in Ben Aknoun in Algiers, with US and UK intelligence officials present alongside Algerian services. This meeting is suggested as potential evidence of the US intervention and a deal reached to stop the trial. The result was that nothing more was heard publicly about General Hassan or the charges against him for 18 months. The investigators stated there was a deal reached between the Algerian Presidency, the DRS and Washington that Hassan not be charged in court following this first arrest. He was evidently released from this initial detention as he was later re-arrested at his home in Chevalley (Algeriers) in August 2015.

The British avoided mentioning anything related to General Abdelkader Aït Ouarabi during the public inquiry

In parallel, the UK public inquiry into the In Amenas gas plant siege systematically omitted any reference to General Abdelkader Aït Ouarabi, the DRS, or state complicity. This omission was not due to lack of evidence. The Metropolitan Police and MI6 had access to interrogation reports from three captured terrorists who survived the siege. All three, under Algerian custody and later interrogated by the FBI, explicitly stated they were armed and instructed by General Aït Ouarabi’s men before the operation. These transcripts were transmitted to U.S. authorities, who confirmed their content. Given the intelligence-sharing agreement between the U.S. and UK, British officials were fully informed.

Yet, during the UK inquiry, the Public Interest Immunity (PII) was invoked. The PII, previously known as Crown privilege, is a principle in English common law under which the English courts can grant a court order allowing one litigant to refrain from disclosing evidence to the other litigants where disclosure would be damaging to the public interest. This meant that key materials from the Tinguentourine attack were protected from being published in the court hearings. The justification was “national security,” but the effect was to shield British interests from being disclosed publicly: BP’s energy infrastructure, intelligence cooperation with Algeria, and UK knowledge of DRS operations.

General Abdelkader Aït Ouarabi second arrest and conviction came on August 27, 2015. That same day, James Clapper, U.S. Director of National Intelligence, landed in Algiers on an unannounced visit. It was interpreted as an urgent move to contain any fallout from Aït Ouarabi’s case, especially as more information linking him to In Amenas was beginning to circulate. This time, the Americans didn’t rescue him from a conviction, but the head of the U.S. DNI was able to secure a containment of the case, as a consequence: charges were deliberately sanitized into administration violations: he faced only procedural accusations: “disobeying orders” and “destroying classified material.” The terrorism charges were gone. The trial was held in secret in Oran, Algeria, no media, family members or any exterior party was allowed to attend. The conviction was confirmed by the Blida military court of appeal four years later, general Hassan served his sentence on November 28, 2020. At the end of March 2021, he was completely cleared by military justice, the court of appeal having pronounced his acquittal.

The DRS’s System of Controlled Instability

One of the most entrenched secrets concerning Algeria’s DRS apparatus, under General Mohamed Mediene and General Abdelkader Aït Ouarabi is the depth of their collaboration with U.S. and UK intelligence services (including CIA, DIA, and MI6) on covert operations. This cooperation, which began following 9/11, involved working “hand in glove” with the DRS, which itself was engaged in the manipulation, infiltration, arming, and deployment of proxy jihadist groups in the Sahel and Maghreb regions. These operations were not merely passive intelligence exchanges. They included P2OG-type joint planning, where the US and Algeria set about the fabrication of ‘false-flag’ terrorist operations in the Algerian Sahara. DRS operatives staged or facilitated attacks under the guise of Islamist insurgency, using DRS-run or infiltrated groups, with the purpose of supporting the U.S. in justifying the launch of a new front in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in Africa, furthering US and Western interests, legitimising the GWOT, and justifying U.S. and British military presence (AFRICOM, drone bases, etc.). Such operations were used as and when the DRS deemed them strategically useful for its own agenda, including objectives related to energy assets, as suggested by warnings related to oil/gas installations. The relationship with the DRS was seen as a “key ally” in the GWOT.

The British state, through its intelligence agencies like MI6, and its links to companies like BP (a partner in the In Amenas joint venture), had significant interests tied to this relationship. MI6 had a close working relationship with the Algerian regime and its DRS through figures like Sir Mark Allen, a businessman and former deputy head of MI6 and head of its counter-terrorism unit, who became a special advisor to the Chairman of BP. Furthermore, Sir John Sawers, head of MI6 from 2009 until late 2014 (and present in Algiers with David Cameron after the In Amenas attack), later joined BP’s board as a non-executive director in May 2015. Sources said Sir John Sawers was “extremely well briefed on the activities and modus operandi of Algeria’s DRS” due to the UK’s close working relationship with them during his tenure.

The sources argue that public exposure of the DRS’s, and specifically General Aït Ouarabi’s role in the In Amenas attack (such as allegedly arming the terrorists) would have directly implicated not only the DRS but also BP and Whitehall. This is because Western intelligence services had worked closely with Hassan and the DRS since 2002 in various “questionable counter-terrorism operations“. The sources strongly suggest that the PII certificate used by the UK government in the In Amenas inquest was not primarily about protecting genuine “national security” in a defensive sense. Instead, it was used to cover up specific incriminating facts and protect a system of collusion and complicity. Reasons for the PII included avoiding disclosure of the captured terrorists’ confessions that they were armed by the DRS/Hassan, and avoiding disclosure of intelligence (like the email forwarded by Hillary Clinton and later revealed by Wikileaks) indicating a briefing from the French DGSE on Tiguentourine attack, which revealed a working agreement between the DRS and Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the “mastermind” of the attack. It also likely aimed to protect the Government of the United Kingdom from being seen as complicit in questionable DRS activities, including the existence of the DRS-managed Tamouret camp where war crimes occurred.

Disclosure would have revealed that Western agencies knew about the DRS’s (including Abdelkader Aït Ouarabi’s) operational behavior, their methods of infiltration and creating groups, and that they continued to work closely with them even after evidence surfaced (like the terrorist confessions) that they had armed or directed elements involved in lethal attacks on Western citizens. The US reportedly intervened in Algerian political infighting -between Saïd Bouteflika/Ahmed Gaïd Salah and Mohamed Mediene) partly to prevent secrets about Abdelkader Aït Ouarabi dealings with terrorist groups from becoming public, precisely because US intelligence had worked closely with him since 2002 and would be seen as complicit.

State blackmail: the DRS threatens to reveal Western complicity in their atrocities, but 1992, 2002 or 2012 are no longer 2025, the world and alliances have changed.

The reactivation of his position in 2025, under the guise of stabilizing the regime and managing French tensions, is neither an accident nor a rehabilitation. It is the reinstatement of an operator who knows the full archive of covert state terror, one whose silence is a strategic asset, and whose command history is not a liability, but a guarantee.

The decision to reinstall Aït Ouarabi is not a reconciliation gesture towards France. It is a calculated move by Mohamed Mediene’s old-DRS to reinstate fledgedly the DRS-state. With martial-law-style legislation in place and popular unrest growing, the regime is preparing for scenarios in which staged internal incidents, used historically to justify not repression but an emergency martial state, may reappear. Aït Ouarabi’s appointment also sends a clear message to Western capitals: the man with operational knowledge of joint covert programs is now in charge. Any move against the Algerian regime risks reopening files that expose past false-flag cooperation, armed proxy management, and energy-sector intelligence operations. The regime is not de-escalating, it is reinforcing its internal security apparatus. The reinstatement of Aït Ouarabi appears to be a calculated move: his background and previous operations as the new DGSI chief point to a strategy of using controlled instability as a means of governance, rather than extending a diplomatic olive branch. Observers interpret the move not as an opening to international negotiation, but as preparatory positioning for domestic scenarios where the regime may need to justify coercive measures, possibly via staged or manipulated “security incidents” in line with past patterns.

However, what the Algerian gerontocracy of Said Chengriha (79), Mohamed Mediene (85), and General Hassan (78), all nearing the end of their political and biological lifespans, fail to grasp is that the geopolitical context has fundamentally shifted. The U.S. administration under Donald Trump has no interest in preserving the strategic architecture of the post-9/11 War on Terror. Trump has openly declared a war on the U.S. intelligence establishment and the legacy of global interventionism it represents. The alliances, priorities, and tolerances of 2002 no longer apply. The DRS can no longer count on quiet cover-ups and strategic indulgence from Washington — and neither from London or Paris. All this clique can do now is delay the inevitable: buy time until death overtakes them, while hoping to suppress the most damning disclosures. These include the DRS’s use of proxy terror, the deliberate targeting of civilians, and the concealment of mass executions in clandestine graves across Algeria.

Abderrahmane Fares ✍️